Background. The incidence of nosocomial infections due to carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella pneumoniae is increasing worldwide. Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) can help elucidate the transmission route of nosocomial pathogens.
Between 2012 and 2016, the Belgian national reference center (NRC) for antibiotic-resistant gram-negative bacilli noted an increase in the number of NDM-producing K. pneumoniae isolates. Currently, NDM is the second most prevalent carbapenemase among isolates referred and confirmed as carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae by our NRC [24] . In particular, 2 Belgian hospitals had outbreaks of NDMproducing K. pneumoniae in [2014] [2015] . In this study, we analyzed these NDM-producing K. pneumoniae outbreaks using a unique combination of WGS-based approaches to identify the link and direction of transmission between the hospitals.
METHODS

Hospital Settings
Hospital A is an academic tertiary care center of 864 beds including 36 intensive care beds divided into 5 intensive care units (ICU). Hospital A has about 30 000 admissions per year, of which 1000 are to the ICU. Hospital B is a general 211-bed institution (including 9 ICU beds) and is part of a multisite general healthcare institution of 838 beds. About 6000 patients are admitted each year to hospital B. Hospitals A and B are located in 2 different Belgian regions and are situated approximately 50 miles apart.
Definitions and Data Collection
An outbreak case was defined as a patient colonized or infected by carbapenem-nonsusceptible K. pneumoniae between August 2014 and December 2015. Post hoc, we classified outbreak cases as proven (NDM-producing K. pneumoniae of identical pulsed-field gel electrophoresis [PFGE] profile and ST) or possible (carbapenem-nonsusceptible K. pneumoniae but without molecular NDM detection or typing analysis). A sporadic case was defined as a molecularly identified NDM-producing K. pneumoniae strain not belonging to the same PFGE type and ST as the proven outbreak case strains. For each hospital, the incidence rate, expressed as the number of cases per 100 000 patient-days, was compared between the outbreak period and 1 year earlier. In addition, we collected the history of the hospital stay, the history of transfers between study hospitals, and the date and type of sample providing the first evidence of carbapenem-nonsusceptible K. pneumoniae. Colonization was defined as the carriage of carbapenem-nonsusceptible K. pneumoniae not treated with active antibiotics, whereas patients treated with active antibiotics were considered infected.
Screening Policy
K. pneumoniae isolates were collected from inpatients of the 2 study hospitals, using cultures of either clinical or rectal screening swab samples. At the time of the outbreak, a screening strategy for gram-negative MDROs was applied systematically at patient admission in 4 high-risk departments (ICU, hematology, geriatric, and gastroenterology wards) in hospital A. In addition, weekly surveillance was carried out during the hospital stay in the ICU and the Department of Hematology. Contact precautions were preemptively used in high-risk patients (ie, those with a travel history and/or previously hospitalized in another institution) until rectal swab sample culture results. This screening policy was continued in hospital A during the study period without additional measures (ie, no cohorting with dedicated nursing staff).
In hospital B, there was no systematic active screening surveillance for gram-negative MDROs until the detection of 3 patients positive for NDM-producing K. pneumoniae in the Department of Internal Medicine. From that moment on, the infection control team started screening for MDROs among (1) contact patients (ie, patients sharing the same room as possible outbreak cases) and (2) inpatients staying ≥15 days in hospital B. In parallel, inpatients from all departments of hospital B were screened during 3 point-prevalence surveys. Patients with positive results were placed on contact precautions and were cohorted in a single ward with dedicated nursing staff.
Bacterial Isolates and Conventional Microbiology Techniques
A total of 74 NDM-producing K. pneumoniae isolates were analyzed in this study ( Figure 1 ). This included 9 isolates from hospital A and 24 from hospital B. For comparison, we also included 41 NDM-producing K. pneumoniae isolates collected elsewhere in Belgium and sent to the NRC in 2014 or 2015. Antimicrobial susceptibility testing was carried out using disk diffusion method (BioRad), according to the European Committee on Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing recommendations (http://www.eucast.org/). The presence of bla NDM was confirmed by means of polymerase chain reaction, as described elsewhere [25] . Molecular typing was performed by genomic macrorestriction (XbaI) followed by PFGE [26] .
WGS, De Novo Assembly, and Genome Annotation
Nucleic acids were extracted using the DNA extraction ultraclean microbial DNA isolation kit (MOBIO). DNA libraries were prepared using Nextera XT DNA library preparation kit (Illumina), following the manufacturer's recommendations except for the normalization step, which was done manually. WGS was performed using the Illumina MiSeq platform (Illumina) to generate 200-base pair paired-end reads. Runs were accepted according to the criteria defined by Illumina for the MiSeq Reagent kit (version 3). De novo assembly was performed using the SPAdes algorithm [27] . Genomes were annotated using BioNumerics software (version 7.6; Applied Maths), and refined using the basic local alignment search tool (BLAST) when necessary (https://blast.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Blast.cgi).
Phylogenetic Analysis and Identification of Antibiotic Resistance Genes
STs were assigned in silico by uploading assembled genomes to the multilocus sequence typing (MLST) 1.8 tool (Center for Genomic Epidemiology; http://www.genomicepidemiology.org/) [28] . The whole-genome MLST (wgMLST) K. pneumoniae scheme available on BioNumerics (version 7.6) was used to compare 4015 genes located on the core and accessory genome [29] . The whole-genome single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) analysis was done on all strains from proven outbreak cases, using Bionumerics software (version 7.6) [29] . For this purpose, we selected a de novo assembled reference genome based on sequence quality criteria for mapping, to determine SNP differences. Default filtering procedures were used to remove artifactual SNPs [30] and to construct minimum spanning trees (see Supplementary Data for additional details regarding SNP analysis). Acquired antimicrobial-resistant genes were identified by uploading assembled genomes with ResFinder software (version 2.1; Center for Genomic Epidemiology) [31] . BLAST analysis and homemade polymerase chain reaction were used to resolve discrepancies.
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RESULTS
Description of Outbreaks
The timeline of proven outbreak cases from hospitals A and B is shown in Figure 1A and Supplementary Figure 1 . Metadata related to proven outbreak cases of hospitals A and B are provided in Supplementary Data (Supplementary Table 1 ).
Hospital A
The incidence rate of NDM-producing K. pneumoniae increased from a baseline rate of 1.5 cases per 100 000 patient-days (time period, August 2013 to July 2014) to 9.4 per 100 000 patient-days during the outbreak period (August 2014 to March 2015). The first patient (patient 1A) was detected in August 2014, 1 month after being admitted to the ICU. We suspected nosocomial acquisition in this first patient because he had had multiple culture-negative rectal swab specimens since admission to hospital A. However, we did not detect other concomitant NDM carrier(s) in the ICU, despite weekly surveillance screening cultures of all ICU patients. Patient 1A was then transferred to the Department of Pneumology. There, a second patient was detected with nosocomial acquisition of NDM-producing K. pneumoniae (patient 2A). We later identified 7 additional infected (n = 4) or colonized (n = 3) patients in 5 wards of hospital A. All 9 isolates showed the same PFGE types and belonged to ST716 (considered as proven outbreak cases). We failed to identify a clear epidemiological link to explain the acquisition of this NDM-producing K. pneumoniae clone for the 7 latter outbreak cases.
Hospital B
An outbreak was declared at hospital B in January 2015 and persisted until December 2015 (end of study). The incidence rate of NDM-producing K. pneumoniae increased from 1 case per 100 000 patient-days in 2014) to 102 cases per 100 000 patientdays in 2015. After the identification of the first 3 NDM-positive K. pneumoniae patients, an active surveillance screening program was implemented, as previously described (Methods section, screening policy paragraph). This demonstrated 64 additional possible outbreak cases involving the entire hospital. The most affected wards were the ICU, the Orthopedic Surgery Unit and the Departments of Geriatric Medicine and Internal Medicine. Twenty-one percent of these patients (18 of 67) were infected; the others were colonized. From the 67 possible outbreak cases, 24 isolates were available for WGS analysis, which demonstrated that 20 of 24 were proven outbreak cases (Figure 2 ). Of these 20 patients, 15 were colonized.
Epidemiological Link Between Hospitals A and B
From the epidemiological data, patient 2A was considered the probable link between the hospitals. First, he was repeatedly seen at the outpatient clinic of hospital B after discharge from hospital A ( Figure 1B) . None of the other proven outbreak case patients from hospital A were referred to hospital B. Second, the first patient detected from hospital B (patient 1B) was treated at the outpatient clinic of hospital B on the same day as patient 2A ( Figure 1B) . No other relevant link could be established between patients from hospitals A and B.
Population Genomic Analysis
Molecular typing using MLST, PFGE, and wgMLST enabled us to separate out the 74 NDM-producing K. pneumoniae strains investigated in this study, as indicated in Figure 2 (see Supplementary Data for WGS assembly quality results, Supplementary Table 2 ). In fact, 30 of 74 strains (ie, all 9 strains from hospital A, 20 of 24 from hospital B, and 1 of 41 from the NRC collection) were assigned to ST716, shared the same PGFE type, and clustered together in the wgMLST analysis ( Figure 2 ). These 30 strains were closely related; they were separated by a mean pairwise allelic distance of only 17 alleles (of 4015 alleles analyzed) and by ≤6 SNPs (Figure 3 ). After construction of a phylogenetic tree (ie, minimum spanning tree), the strain genome from patient 2A was consistent with a progenitor status relative to hospital B cases ( Figure 3 ). In fact, this strain was just a single SNP away from a genome type occupying a central node position relative to all hospital B genomes, and only 3 SNPs different from the patient 1B strain genome. Of note, the single strain from the NRC (isolated in November 2015) was detected in a hospital located close to hospital B, and belonged to a patient who had been hospitalized in hospital B in October 2015. In contrast, the remaining 44 strains from hospital B (4 of 24) and the NRC (40 of 41) showed completely different pulsotypes, displayed a variety of distinct STs (ST11, ST15, ST307, and ST432) and a mean pairwise allelic distance of 3348 relative to the proven outbreak strains (in line with the allelic diversity described elsewhere for K. pneumoniae [32] ).
Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing and Resistome Analysis
Phenotypically, all proven outbreak strains were resistant to all tested β-lactams, fluoroquinolones and trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole. Most were susceptible to colistin (29 of 30), chloramphenicol (26 of 30), amikacin (22 of 30), and tigecycline (18 of 30) .
Our population of proven outbreak strains had 2 major phenotypic and genotypic resistance patterns (Supplementary Table 3 ). The first pattern (8 of 30 strains), phenotypically characterized by amikacin-resistance and genotypically by carriage of bla , aac(6´)Ib, and aadA1 genes (by a Tn1331-like transposon), was found in all patients from hospital A, except patient 2A. The second pattern (22 of 30 strains) was characterized phenotypically by susceptibility to amikacin and genotypically by the absence of the previously listed genes, due to the loss of the Tn1331-like element. This pattern was identified in the strain from patient 2A (hospital A), as well as in all 20 proven outbreak strains collected from hospital B. We therefore concluded that patient 2A probably introduced the ST716 NDMproducing K. pneumoniae into hospital B.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we investigated 2 outbreaks of NDM-producing K. pneumoniae occurring in 2 Belgian hospitals. First, we identified K. pneumoniae ST716, an infrequently reported clone [33] , as being responsible for both outbreaks. We combined epidemiological data with WGS data-including findings from high-resolution typing methods and a resistome analysis-to identify the outpatient clinic of hospital B as the probable transmission bridge between these outbreaks.
Because of decreasing costs and technological improvements enabling fast and high-resolution results, WGS is increasingly being used in clinical microbiology, especially to analyze nosocomial outbreaks [23] . Unlike conventional typing methods, such as PFGE and MLST, WGS provides multiple information levels from a single technique, including data on antimicrobial resistance, genome comparison, wgMLST, and SNP analysis [23] .
Using PFGE and WGS, we showed that the NDMproducing K. pneumoniae outbreaks observed in hospitals A and B were due to the same NDM-producing K. pneumoniae clone (ie, ST716). The first outbreak case was detected in hospital A in August 2014. It is probable that additional National Reference Center collection: Figure 2 . Flowchart of included cases and analysis performed. Proven outbreak cases were defined as colonization or infection with a New Delhi metallo-β-lactamase (NDM)-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae of identical pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) type and sequence type (ST); possible outbreak cases, as colonization or infection with a carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae with no molecular analysis of the isolate; and sporadic cases, as carriage of a molecularly identified NDM-producing K. pneumoniae strain not belonging to the same PFGE type and ST as the proven outbreak case strains. Abbreviations: MLST, multilocus ST; NDM+, NDM-producing; SNP, single-nucleotide polymorphism; wgMLST, whole-genome MLST; WGS, whole-genome sequencing.
colonized patients passed unnoticed because of the lack of a systematic active surveillance screening policy for MDROs in some units and wards of hospital A. Regarding hospital B, the NDM-producing K. pneumoniae outbreak was detected in January 2015 and involved 67 possible outbreak cases. Our findings highlight the advantages of centralizing data (eg, at the NRC) to help document MDRO outbreaks and identify links between hospitals [34] .
Our genomic and epidemiological data converged to identify the outpatient clinic of hospital B as the specific site linking the 2 outbreaks. The second proven outbreak case patient (patient 2A) was referred from hospital A to the outpatient clinic of hospital B, and his visit there overlapped with a visit by patient 1B. This epidemiological suspicion was supported by 2 distinct lines of WGS-derived evidence. First, our SNP-based phylogenetic reconstruction showed that a single SNP separated the genome of patient 2A's strain from a central node (patient 9A's strain) relative to all hospital B nodes, and patient 2A's strain genome was only 3 SNPs away from that in patient 1B. This position is consistent with the hypothesis that patient 2A carried a progenitor-or a microvariant of this progenitor-of the hospital B strains.
Second, resistome analysis allowed us to reinforce the hypothesis that the transmission occurred between patients 2A and 1B. Indeed, the loss of the Tn1331-like transposon detected in the patient 2A strain represents more precise evidence for the transmission from hospital A to hospital B via this patient. Patient 2A was the only patient from hospital A whose strain did not carry this transposon. Conversely, this transposon was absent in all patient strains from hospital B. The loss of this transposon served as a marker of transmission from hospital A to hospital B, in addition to MLST, wgMLST, and SNP results. Hitherto, these different layers have rarely been used in conjunction for outbreak investigation. Our study highlights the importance of a multimodal approach combining multiple WGS results (eg, findings from MLST, wgMLST, SNP analysis, and resistome data) with epidemiological data for outbreak investigation.
The hospitalization report for patient 2A did not specify his NDM-producing K. pneumoniae carrier status at the time of referral to the outpatient clinic at hospital B. Communication between healthcare facilities should be optimized by using electronic medical records and possibly by educating the patient [35] . Such measures may enable earlier appropriate infection control measures to be implemented after the interfacility transfer of patients carrying MDROs. In this case, the fact that the source patient (patient 2A) was seen at an outpatient clinic rather than in an acute care facility may have facilitated the dissemination of the NDM-producing K. pneumoniae ST716 clone. Indeed, outpatient clinics often lack appropriate resources and strategies to prevent dissemination of MDROs, as highlighted elsewhere [36] . The implementation of adequate infection control measures in outpatient settings is crucial, because the healthcare delivery system increasingly switches between acute care facilities and outpatient clinics [35, 36] .
This study has some limitations. The transmission route that we suggest (ie, transmission from patient 2A to patient 1B via the outpatient clinic of hospital B) cannot be formally proved, because no screening policy was performed before the first case was detected in hospital B. Alternate or additional transmission source(s) (eg, shared staff or visiting relatives) cannot be excluded owing to the retrospective study design. In particular, there was no systematic screening for NDM-producing K. pneumoniae isolates in the contact patients of outbreak cases from hospital A. As a consequence, we may have missed identifying additional carriers of this NDM-producing ST716 K. pneumoniae clone who were transferred to hospital B. However, both patient stay information and resistome analysis using WGS strongly support the role of patient 2A in the dissemination of the NDM-producing ST716 K. pneumoniae clone from hospital A to B via the outpatient clinic.
In conclusion, a multimodal analysis (ie, combination of multiple results from WGS with epidemiological data) enabled us to conclude that a multihospital outbreak of NDM-producing K. pneumoniae was most likely due to the same NDM-producing K. pneumoniae ST716 clone. More specifically, we identified the outpatient clinic as the probable transmission site bridging the 2 outbreaks. Our findings highlight the importance of implementing adequate infection control measures in outpatient settings, especially as healthcare delivery moves from acute care facilities to outpatient clinics. Further studies are required to determine the importance of outpatient facilities in the dissemination of MDROs, and possibly to identify measures to prevent the spread of these organisms in such settings.
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